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Different Types of Participation in Constitution Making Processes: Towards a
Conceptualisation

Abrak Saati
(Umeå University, Sweden)

Though participatory constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states
transitioning from authoritarian rule have become a new trend, scholarly research has yet to
approach the notion of participation in a sharp and distinct way. In this article, I develop a novel
approach for differentiating participation in constitution making, depending on the extent of
influence that participants are granted, illustrating this reasoning with eight empirical cases from
the African continent.

1. Introduction
Since the dawn of the peacebuilding era, scholars of constitutional design have observed
that a new norm, or at least a new ‘best practices’ standard, has developed with regard to
the design of constitution making processes in post-conflict states and in states
transitioning from authoritarian rule. This new standard puts ordinary women and men at
the front and center of the making of their founding laws and it has developed into a
peacebuilding strategy because of a number of perceived beneficial effects, not least
because it is held to promote democracy and lead to sustainable peace. The emphasis on
broad based public participation, nevertheless, challenges the customary way through
which constitutions have traditionally been produced. To be sure, as noted by Arato
(2000), Hart (2010) and Tully (1995), constitution making has for a long time been an area
strictly reserved for political elites and lawyers. A normative change has, however, been
accompanied by new policy standards enthusiastically promoted by international
organisations and individual scholars (e.g. Ghai and Galli, 2006; Samuels, 2006; Banks,
2007; Wing, 2008). Hence, traditional methods of arriving at a final document have had to
give way to the new trend of public involvement in constitution making.
Though public engagement in constitution making in post-conflict states and in
states transitioning from authoritarian rule has increased since the 1990s, up to the point
that the term ‘participatory constitution making’ is by now commonplace (Ginsburg et al.,
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2009; Brandt et al., 2011), scholarly research has yet to approach the concept of
‘participation’ in an analytically sharp and distinct way. In fact, as things stand today,
different cases are being lumped together and designated a general label of being examples
of participatory constitution making, in turn indicating that the participation of the people
has been uniform with the same extent of influence in all cases. This is, however, quite far
from the truth, and addressing what participation implies, how it can be distinguished and
hence operationalised, is necessary for two distinct reasons. To begin with, if public
participation in constitution making is going to be promoted as a policy, then those who are
issuing this policy have an undeniable interest in understanding how participation can take
different forms with different amounts of influence for participants. Second, a greater
understanding of what participation in constitution making actually entails and how
different types of participation can be differentiated from each other in a systematic way
provides necessary knowledge for future research projects that may wish to focus on
analysing the effects of participation in constitution making on different outcomes of
interest (e.g. democracy, legitimacy, reconciliation, etc.).
In this article, my focus is on the conceptualisation and differentiation of public
participation in constitution making. This is an important contribution because when it
comes to differentiating participatory constitution making processes based on how
participation has taken form, there is no previous research to lean on. Therefore, in the first
part of the article, I engage in a novel approach of developing an analytical framework for
analysing public participation in constitution making and a new typology of participation in
such processes specifically. Depending on a) who the initiators of the constitution making
process are; b) how the forms of communication with the public are constructed; c) how
inclusive the process is; and d) where final authority over the constitutional document is
vested, it is possible to categorise cases as different types of participation, namely: false,
symbolic, limited, consultative or substantial participation. I then use this analytical
framework to categorise eight African cases that are commonly (and uniformly) referred to
as ‘participatory processes’ in order to illustrate that public participation in constitution
making has indeed varied extensively across cases with very different extents of influence
over the constitutional content for participants. The eight empirical cases are: Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
When it comes to the method for constructing the analytical framework, it should be
noted that it is developed by using a combination of deductive and inductive analysis. In
practice this means that I have moved back and forth between theory and the empirical
material, which consists of an original set of twenty participatory constitution making
processes that have been carried out in different parts of the world (Saati, 2015). An
inductive-deductive approach has been chosen because although the written works of
classical participation theorists – particularly the scholarly contributions of Pateman
(1970) and Arnstein (1969) – are valuable since they acknowledge that participation can
take different forms and because they provide some theoretical guidance for developing a
19
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typology of participation that is specific for constitution making, they also share a
weakness. Existing categorisations and typologies of participation fail to be specific as to
what exactly makes a specific case of participation an example of a specific type. In order to
be as explicit as possible, the study presented here has found it critical to also allow the
typology to be influenced by the empirical material. Hence, my typology of false, symbolic,
limited, consultative and substantial types of participation in constitution making sets out
to be as detailed as possible concerning why a specific case of participation is categorised
as a specific type.
2. Public Participation in Constitution Making: Towards a Conceptualisation
When it comes to public participation in constitution making, the lack of definitional clarity
in present scholarly work has caused some confusion, in so far as it has led many to
construe more participation as an issue of quantity. In a sense, this is a view that the more
people that have been involved in a constitution making process, the more participatory
the process has been. It is for example not at all uncommon, rather the contrary, that
reference is made to the number of constitutional submissions that have been received by
the people in a given process and the number of public hearings that have been held (e.g.
Rosenn, 2010; Thier, 2010; Ebrahim and Miller, 2010) as an indication of how participatory
a constitution making process has been. It is important to note, however, that even if a
considerable number of individuals participate in their country’s constitution making
process, this does not reveal whether or not their participation has had an effect on the
constitutional content or whether or not the constitutional draft enters into force. Hence, in
order to be able to define ‘participation’, a first step is to acknowledge that participation in
constitution making is in fact a political form of participation and as such entails the core
notion of influence. To be clear, this study accepts the view that the concept of participation
includes the degree of influence participants have over decisions being made in relation to
the constitutional document – both in terms of its content and in terms of its adoption. To
capture the degree of influence is, in turn, not easily done by the use of quantitative
measures – rather a qualitative approach is required. In the next part of this section, I move
on to present and discuss four factors that determine the extent of influence that
participants are granted in a given constitution making process.2

2.1 The Initiators of the Process
The first factor that impacts the extent of influence that the public is allowed during a
constitution making process concerns the initiators of the process. The agents who decide
that constitutional reform should be undertaken and who also determine the rules of
2

These four factors are elaborated in much fuller detail in Saati (2015).
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procedure that will guide the reform process, undoubtedly have the opportunity to design
the process to encourage/discourage participation in a manner that results in influence for
participants. As regards the agents of constitutional reform in post-conflict states and in
states transitioning from authoritarian rule, an initial distinction can be made between
initiators who are ‘outsiders’ (international and regional actors as well as individual
states), and those who are ‘insiders’ (national actors). These two broader categories can be
further differentiated into different types. When it comes to the ‘outsiders’, we on the one
hand have actors who influence the actual content of the constitution, and on the other
hand, actors who determine how the constitution making process will be carried out (but
without getting themselves involved in formulating content). Without a doubt, between the
two types, the first is more influential since authority over constitutional content rests with
outsiders, rather than with national elites and even less so with ordinary citizens. ‘Insiders’
as agents of constitutional reform are just as the outsiders, a heterogeneous group of
people and/or organisations whose motives for constitutional reform originate from
different goals and purposes. On a general level, three different types of inside initiators
can be discerned: national elites (political or military), civil society organisations or a
broad array of national actors who jointly agree that constitutional reform is desirable. To
sum up: the first of four factors that can be used to determine the degree of influence for
participants in a constitution making process relates to the issue of agency and the
actor/actors resolve (or lack of resolve) to allow the public to influence the content of the
constitution.

2.2 The Forms of Communication
The second aspect that has a bearing on how the people can participate in the constitution
making process, and thereby try to exert influence, concerns the forms of communication.
The subject under consideration is: how is the process being communicated to the public
and how (if at all) is the public called upon to actively participate? In constitution making
processes, forms of communication can generally take one of four different modes. The first
is a one-way model of communication in which the initiators of the process are primarily
interested in keeping the people informed about the constitution making process, but
without allowing them to influence the document. Channels for feedback from the public
are hence shut. The second mode is a two-way model of communication, which signals that
communication channels are at least open in both directions. However, this does not
necessarily imply that participants are guaranteed influence, since those who are tasked
with the actual drafting of the constitution might not be legally compelled to consider and
include the feedback into the draft. The third approach is a two-way model of
communication with integrated proactive measures. This communication plan is used by
initiators of the process who are sincerely interested in listening to the opinions of the
people on constitutional subjects. In response, different mechanisms are put in practice
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during the course of the constitution making process that serve to enable the people’s
participation and to make it possible for them to provide feedback. An example of such a
proactive initiative is to carry out constitutional education programmes prior to asking the
public about their views on various constitutional proposals. The fourth mode is that of
consultation. When the form of communication is that of consultation, the
comprehensiveness of the communication strategy is even more elaborate than in the third
approach. The communication scheme involves mechanisms for systematically reviewing
the comments of the people in order to facilitate the gathering of additional opinions from
them as regards specific suggestions, etc. As part of a more exhaustive communication
strategy, constitutional education programmes are also carried out on a nationwide scale
and constructed so as to be adaptable for people with varying degrees of previous
knowledge concerning constitutional issues.

2.3 The Degree of Inclusion
For purposes of making a fair assessment of how participatory a constitution making
process has been, the third factor that must be considered is the degree of inclusion. When
it comes to this aspect specifically, we want to understand if all groups in society have been
invited to participate or if some have been disqualified from making their voices heard, as
well as whether invited groups have voluntarily chosen not to participate. While inclusion
in and by itself does not equal influence, it is nonetheless an important aspect to take into
account, because if some groups are banned from participating and/or some groups
boycott the process then this impacts of the public’s overall degree of influence on the
content of the constitution. On a general level, the scope of inclusion in constitution making
can take three different expressions. The first is that some groups/political parties are
forbidden to participate. The second is that participation is an option made available for all
groups/political parties in a country, some of whom, by choice, refrain from using their
right to engage. The third is a constitution making process in which all groups/political
parties are welcome to participate, and all groups interested in engaging do so.

2.4 The Question of Final Authority
The last factor that is also important to consider when assessing how participatory a
constitution making process is, concerns the question of final authority. Although voting
may be considered an insufficient form of participation, if one construes participation to
hold deeper meaning than to merely vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a political package of
constitutional provisions, it is still a manifestation of public influence, and particularly so if
approval via referendum is decisive for the adoption of a draft constitution. When it comes
to constitution making processes specifically, the question of final authority can generally
take three different expressions. Sometimes final authority over the document is vested in
22
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the hands of an appointed or executive body whereas in other cases, final authority is
indirectly vested in the hands of the people through, for example, a popularly elected
constitutional assembly. Final authority may also be vested directly in the hands of the
people through a referendum.
To summarise: there are four main factors that can be used to determine the extent of
influence for participants in a constitution making process. These have been briefly
discussed in this section. Table 1 illustrates how different combinations of these factors
give rise to different types of participation, namely: false, symbolic, limited, consultative
and substantial. This typology is the first of its kind to be developed for the sole purpose of
distinguishing different types of participation in constitution making processes from each
other and it is an important contribution because it aims to demonstrate that there are
indeed vast differences between various forms of participation in constitution making. It
should be noted that moving from false to substantial (from the far left to the right of the
table) signals an increasing level of influence for participants. In the final row of the table,
the eight empirical cases are categorised into the participation type that best reflects the
extent of participation in that specific constitution making process. Of course, it is worth
emphasising that all of these cases are unique as regards the circumstances that led up to
the process and the exact procedures that were employed during the course of it.
Consequently, some cases are more difficult to classify as a specific type of participation
than others. Nevertheless, based on thorough and systematic research (Saati, 2015), the
four factors and how they play out in each of the cases give a good indication as to how
public participation in constitution making has taken form and with what degree of
influence for participants.
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Table 1. Typology of Different Forms of Participation in Constitution Making

False
participation

Symbolic
participation

Limited
participation

Consultative
participation

Substantial
participation

Initiators of the
process

Outside actor
(determines the
content of the
constitution or
the process)

Outside actor
(determines the
constitution
making
process), or
different types
of inside actors

National elites
(political or
military)

National elites
(political or
military)

Civil society
organisations,
or broad array
of national
actors

Forms of
communication

One-way model
of
communication

One-way model
of
communication

Two-way model
of
communication,
or two-way
model of
communication
with integrated
proactive
measures

Two-way
model of
communication
with integrated
proactive
measures/

Two-way
model of
communication
with integrated
proactive
measures/

Consultation

Consultation

All segments of
the population/

All segments of
the population/

All segments of
the population/

All segments of
the population/

political parties
allowed to
participate, but
some choose to
boycott the
process

political parties
allowed to
participate, but
some choose to
boycott the
process

political parties
allowed to
participate, and
all interested in
doing so
participate

political parties
allowed to
participate, but
some choose to
boycott the
process/

Degree of
inclusion

Certain groups
banned from
participation

All segments of
the population/
political parties
allowed to
participate, and
all participate
Final authority

Final authority
rests with the
executive or
indirectly in the
hands of the
public

Final authority
rests with the
executive or
indirectly in the
hands of the
public

Final authority
indirectly
vested in the
hands of the
people

Final authority
indirectly
vested in the
hands of the
people

Final authority
directly vested
in the hands of
the people
through a
referendum

Empirical
case(s):

Empirical
case(s):

Empirical
case(s):

Empirical
case(s):

Empirical
case(s):

Nigeria

-

Rwanda,
Uganda,
Ethiopia

South Africa,
Eritrea

Kenya,
Zimbabwe
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3. Discussing the Categorisation of Two Empirical Cases
It is worthwhile to briefly elaborate the discussion through a few empirical cases that we
find in Table 1 in order for the classification to become clearer. I will in this section,
therefore, devote attention to the cases of Nigeria and Uganda.3 When elaborating on these
cases, the discussion will follow the structure that we find in the column to the left in Table
1.

3.1 Nigeria
The 1999 constitution making process of Nigeria was initiated by the military. As regards
the forms of communication, a time span of two months to finalise the process made it
nearly impossible to include Nigeria’s large population of 115 million4 people in the making
of the constitution. Furthermore, judging from the set-up of the process it appears as
though the Nigerian military was interested in soliciting the views of the public only if they
expressed support for a strong military branch and not otherwise (Jega, 2000). In terms of
degree of inclusion, the CDCC (Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee) did not
engage the Nigerian opposition: the National Democratic Coalition, the United Action for
Democracy and the Joint Action Committee of Nigeria, for example, were not consulted. The
opposition was rather completely sidestepped in the making of the constitution
(Ihonvbere, 2000). Lastly, when it comes to the question of final authority with regards to
the adoption of the draft constitution, this was vested in the hands of the executive without
any public influence at all. Hence, when taking all of these factors into account, the 1999
Nigerian constitution building process did not produce participation that resulted in actual
influence for participants. This explains why it is categorised as an example of false
participation in Table 1.

3.2 Uganda
Immediately after it gained power, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government
in Uganda declared that the country would embark on a constitution making process that
would produce a new constitution made by the people of Uganda. As to the forms of
communication, a 21-member Constitutional Commission was established to review the
old constitution and prepare a new one. The commissions agreed that it was vitally
important that the Ugandan people be the main agenda setters for the new document.
Therefore, the Commission organised seminars throughout all 34 districts of the country in
3
4

For further details and discussion about the categorisation of all empirical cases in Table 1, see Saati (2015).
1999 estimation.
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order to develop a constitutional agenda that was based on the input of the people. Over
the course of an entire year, constitutional education programmes were carried out on a
nationwide scale, in all of Uganda’s 890 sub-counties, constitutional materials were
disseminated. After that, for another full year, constitutional submissions were gathered
from the public in all parts of the country. However, the degree to which the popularly
derived constitutional provisions are actually reflected in the document is difficult to
establish. It has been argued that although the magnitude of public participation in the
process was extensive, the public’s input had little real impact on the substance of the
document and the ruling elites’ main purpose in involving the citizens was to give the
constitution a ‘shimmer’ of legitimacy (Tripp, 2010). Nevertheless, in terms of involving
and preparing the Ugandans to participate in the process, the constitution making process
in Uganda was successful (Waliggo, 2001; Wapakhabulo, 2001; Mugwanya, 2001). At the
same time, regarding the degree of inclusion, the Ugandan process was not fully inclusive.
Although politicians could engage in the process in their capacity as Ugandan citizens, they
were not allowed to engage as representatives of a political party, because political parties
as such were banned from participation (Tripp, 2010). When it comes to the question of
final authority over the constitution, this was not directly vested in the hands of the people,
but indirectly so. The Ugandans voted for members of a Constitutional Assembly who, in
turn, voted on the final document. The combination of these factors explains why Uganda
has been categorised as an example of limited participation in Table 1.
4. Concluding Remarks
The analytical framework for differentiating participatory constitution making processes
into different types of participation, depending on how much influence participants have
been granted, helps us approach this area of research in an analytically sharp and distinct
way. This is a novel approach that seeks to be of value for future research projects that set
out to both understand the extent of influence for participants in individual cases of
constitution making, as well as to analyse whether certain types of participation affect
various outcomes of interest in different ways. Indeed, as we move forth and aspire to
increase our knowledge about participatory constitution making in post-conflict states and
in states under transition from authoritarian rule, the outcomes of these processes at an
individual as well as on a macro-level of analysis are an intriguing area of research waiting
to be explored.
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